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In spite of the potential benefits of board IT governance and the costs of ineffective oversight, there has been 
little field-based research in this area and an inadequate application of theory. Drawing upon strategic choice 
and institutional theories, we propose a theoretical model that seeks to explain the antecedents of board IT 
governance and its consequences. Survey responses from 188 corporate directors across Canada indicate that 
both board attributes and organizational factors influence board involvement in IT governance. The results 
suggest that proportion of insiders, board size, IT competency, organizational age, and role of IT influence the 
board’s level of involvement in IT governance. The responses also indicate that board IT governance has a 
positive impact on the contribution of IT to organizational performance. Overall, the results support the 
integration of strategic choice and institutional theories to explain the antecedents to board IT governance 
and its consequences, as together they provide a more holistic framework with which to view board IT 
governance. 
 
Keywords: IT Governance, Board of Directors, Corporate Governance, Strategic Choice Theory, Institutional 
Theory, Contribution of IT to Organizational Performance. 
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1. Introduction 
The practioner and academic literature has paid increased attention to the practice of information 
technology (IT) governance by boards of directors. However, it seems that many corporate boards do 
not explicitly practice a formalized style of IT governance, and of those that do, many face significant 
challenges. The potential impact of ineffective IT governance is clear, with organizations spending an 
increasing amount on IT, with a median level of spending on IT hitting 1.8 percent of revenues for 
organizations in the US (Computer Economics, 2010), and a large percentage of these IT 
investments failing to deliver their intended return. Recently, studies have suggested the need for 
effective board-level IT governance in order to realize value from IT (e.g., Andriole, 2009; Buckby, 
Best, & Stewart, 2005; IT Governance Institute, 2003; Nolan & McFarlan, 2005; Trites, 2004). 
 
In spite of the increased recognition of the potential benefits of board IT governance in the literature and 
the well known issues with IT failures, there appears to have been little field-based research conducted 
in this area, and little application of theory to examine board IT governance. Specifically, the relationship 
between board IT governance and IT value has not been empirically evaluated. Drawing upon two 
complementary perspectives – strategic choice and institutional theories – we propose a theoretical 
model that seeks to explain the antecedents of board IT governance and its consequences. 
 
The theoretical model has three premises. First, based upon strategic choice theory, we suggest that 
board attributes – proportion of insiders, size, and IT competency of directors – reflect the potential level 
of IT strategic judgment of a board, and also influence a board’s potential involvement in IT governance. 
Second, we suggest that it is insufficient to simply examine the influence of individual board member 
attributes on board IT governance, because this approach does not consider institutional pressures. 
Therefore, based upon institutional theory, we propose that organizational characteristics – size, age, 
and role of IT – also influence a board’s involvement in IT governance. Third, based upon the argument 
from strategic choice theory that organizational strategy impacts firm performance,and that board 
involvement improves organizational strategy, we propose that the extent to which IT contributes to firm 
performance is a function of the level of board involvement in IT governance. 
 
To explore the proposed model, we first conducted interviews with corporate directors to examine the 
theoretical premises, and used the interview results to develop the survey instrument. We then 
executed an online survey to explore the model across a larger number of boards. 
 
We first define board IT governance and discuss the characteristics of IT that distinguish it from 
boards’ other governance responsibilities. We then overview the applicable IT governance literature 
with a focus on the role of the board in IT governance and highlighting the gap between practice and 
theory. Next, we describe, in general, strategic choice and institutional theories, and follow with the 
research model and propositions. We then present the methodology, which includes the data 
collection process, the development of measures and the validation process, and the examination of 
the model using multiple regression. Finally, we discuss the findings and propose the contributions of 
the research. 
2. Board IT Governance Defined 
According to a number of researchers, there remains limited understanding of the role of the board in 
IT governance (e.g., De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2005; Huff, Maher, & Munro, 2006; Jordan & 
Musson, 2004; Trites, 2004). The situation is confounded by the lack of one generally accepted 
definition for IT governance (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2005; Simonsson & Johnson, 2005). Van 
Grembergen and De Haes (2009) present one of the most recent definitions: 
 
Enterprise governance of IT is an integral part of enterprise governance and addresses 
the definition and implementation of processes, structures and relational mechanisms in 
the organization that enable both business and IT people to execute their responsibilities 
in support of business/IT alignment and the creation of business value. 
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This research adopts one of the most widely cited definitions: 
 
IT governance is the responsibility of the board of directors and executive management. It is 
an integral part of enterprise governance and consists of the leadership and organizational 
structures and processes that ensure that the organization’s IT sustains and extends the 
organization’s strategies and objectives (IT Government Institute, 2003, p.10). 
 
These definitions are similar in terms of substance; however, we adopt the definition of the IT 
Governance Institute because this definition specifically delineates IT governance as a responsibility 
of both the board of directors and executive management. This is important because most IT 
governance research has not focused on how the board is involved and has instead focused on 
executive management’s use of organizational structures and the contingences that influence the 
choice of structure (Brown & Grant, 2005). There is an important distinction between IT governance 
and IT management – IT governance is the responsibility of the board, and the implementation of IT 
governance mechanisms in the organization is the responsibility of executive management, as a part 
of IT management. This distinction can impact research agendas and the use of research results. 
3. Corporate Governance vs. IT Governance 
Most regard the key role of the board as the separation of oversight from management decision 
making, thus assuring stakeholders that the organization is using its resources as intended. 
 
There are many empirical studies on the antecedents and consequences of board involvement in 
corporate governance (e.g., refer to LeBlanc, 2003, and Appendix B for an extensive summary of the 
literature); however, it is not sufficient to assume that these are the same for IT governance because 
of the differences between IT and other areas of an organization traditionally governed by the board. 
In particular, the pervasiveness, complexity, and rapidly changing nature of IT have changed the 
knowledge and experience required to govern an organization (Weill & Ross, 2004). Furthermore, IT 
may also require domain-specific knowledge and experience required for its governance and for 
understanding the impact of IT on the business operational and strategic goals. Thus, the inherent 
differences between IT and traditional areas of corporate governance suggest the need to better 
understand board IT governance. 
4. Literature Review – IT Governance 
The overall scope of IT governance is situated at multiple layers in the organization – at the 
management level, and at the strategic level where the board is involved (De Haes & Van 
Grembergen, 2008b). Accordingly, as shown in Figure 1, the IT governance literature can be 
classified into two separate streams. The first focuses on the design of decision-making structures at 
the managerial level, while the second focuses on the role of the board. 
 
The first stream – which focuses on the design of decision-making structures at the managerial level 
– appears to be the predominant line of research in the literature. In a general review of IT 
governance (Brown & Grant, 2005), we identified three categories focusing on the design of decision-
making structures of IT governance: (1) IT organizational structures (centralized vs. decentralized and 
horizontal vs. vertical); (2) contingencies of these IT governance structures; and (3) Weill and Ross’ 
IT governance framework (2004), which is an extension of the other two categories. 
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Figure 1. Review of IT Governance Literature 
 
The second stream of research – focusing on the role of the board in IT governance – can be 
classified as either normative or descriptive. The normative literature (Buckby et al., 2005; Nolan & 
McFarlan, 2005; IT Government Institute, 2003; Trites, 2004) advocates the importance of the board’s 
role in IT governance, while the descriptive literature studies how boards are actually governing IT 
(refer to Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Studies of the Board’s Role in IT Governance 
 Research Question 
Data 
Collection Sample Findings 
Jordan and 
Musson 
(2004) 
How are boards 
dealing with IT 
governance?  
Interview  
13 board members 
(with positions on 60 
boards). 
Knowledge of IT poor  
Limited experience in e-commerce  
e-commerce ventures primarily reviewed 
and implemented by consultants, not the 
board. 
De Haes and 
Van 
Grembergen 
(2005) 
Can IT 
governance be 
deployed using 
a mixture of 
structures, 
processes, and 
relational 
mechanisms?  
Interview, 
review of 
reports  
1 organization 
(Belgian Financial 
Group)  
Interviewed IT and 
business managers, 
CIO, IT governance 
project manager, 
member of the board, 
executive committee.  
Executive Committee reports to the board 
monthly on major events and projects  
IT Strategy Committee consists of three 
board members; however, it “did not enable 
a more thorough and ongoing involvement 
of boards in IT governance” (p. 5). 
The “Board works at a very high, strategic 
level and they are consequently not the 
steering power  for IT or IT governance”  
(p. 5). 
Huff et al. 
(2006) 
How are boards 
dealing with IT 
governance?  
Interview  
17 board chairs, 
board members and 
17 CIOs in the same 
medium to large 
companies  
(half financial 
services and half 
primary resources). 
IT attention deficit in boards  
CIOs think that boards should pay more 
attention. 
Boards pay attention to IT Risk. 
Half of financial service firms and no primary 
resources companies pay attention to other 
IT governance topics. 
None of the companies have board-level 
committees. 
CIOs do not support board-level 
committees.  
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Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Studies of the Board’s Role in IT Governance (cont.) 
 Research Question 
Data 
Collection Sample Findings 
Deloitte 
Consulting 
LLP and 
Corporate 
Board Member 
Magazine 
(2006)  
Is the board 
involved in IT 
Strategies?  
Survey  
455 directors at 
$1B public 
companies 
worldwide (out of 
10,000 surveys). 
Overall think IT strategy and implementation 
is important to the success of the company  
13.8% of boards completely and actively 
involved in IT. 
66.5% think IT should be discussed at the 
board level. 
56.4% of boards have 3 or more members 
knowledgeable in IT (only 8% of boards 
have no members with IT knowledge). 
Andriole 
(2009)  
Do boards of 
directors govern 
IT?  
Survey  More than 50 CIOs and CTOs. 
Boards do not participate nearly enough in 
major technology decisions, are out of the 
loop on technology issues, and are missing 
opportunities to optimize operational and 
strategic technology investments. 
Parent and 
Reich (2009)  
How can boards 
of directors 
govern IT risk?  
Interviews, 
review of 
reports  
17 interviews at 6 
firms. 
Suggest areas that should be considered by 
directors to govern IT risk such as 
ITcompliance risk, infrastructure risk, project 
risk, business continuity risk, and 
information risk. 
Bart and Turel 
(2010)  
The extent to 
which the IT 
governance 
questions 
proposed by the 
CICA were being 
used in practice.  
Survey  94 Directors. 
Board members ask only about  
44.4% of the 27 CICA IT board governance 
questions.  
Suggested that board members may simply 
not be paying sufficient attention to the 
governance of IT in their organizations due 
to lack of knowledge or education. 
 
As Table 1 shows, a review of the descriptive literature revealed very few studies concentrating on how 
the board is actually involved in IT governance. Although the number of studies is relatively small, the 
consensus is that boards are not fulfilling their IT governance duties effectively. The studies imply that a 
gap exists between the normative and descriptive research, with the board’s involvement in IT 
governance in practice falling well short of the level of involvement proposed in the literature. In addition, 
the review of the literature did not find any empirical studies examining the antecedents or 
consequences of board IT governance. 
5. Theoretical Background 
We have focused on the institutional and strategic choice perspectives as a way of theorizing about 
board IT governance. The theories operate under different, partially-overlapping theoretical 
assumptions, and thus, each theory gives a limited explanation of the whole phenomenon of the 
antecedents to board IT governance and its consequences. Together, they provide a more holistic 
framework with which to view board IT governance. 
5.1. Strategic Choice Theory 
Strategic choice theorists focus on organizational actors and the role that they play in organizational 
change, instead of focusing solely on change as a passive environmental selection process, which is 
the focus of institutional theory (Child, 1997). Strategic choice theorists propose that structural 
determinism (i.e., institutional theory) is inadequate because it ignores the influence that leaders of 
organizations may have on the design and structure of organizations. 
5.2. Institutional Theory 
Institutional theorists emphasize “environmental norms and the weight of firm history as explanations 
of organizational actions” (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992, p. 769). Institutional theorists, thus, view 
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organizational behavior as “the product of ideas, values and beliefs” – institutional pressures – and 
propose that “organizational behaviors are responses to not only market pressures but to institutional 
pressures” (Greenwood & Hinnings, 1996, p. 1025). 
5.3. Integration of Theories 
We propose that strategic choice and institutional theories offer complementary views of why 
boards decide to become involved in the governance of IT. Proponents of these theories have 
noted the need to apply both theories together to understand organizational behavior and that one 
of these theories – either a purely deterministic or non-deterministic perspective – would be 
insufficient for explaining organizational behavior (e.g., Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Oliver, 1991). “The major 
criticisms of institutional theory have been its assumptions of organizational passivity and its failure 
to address strategic behavior and the exercise of influence in its conceptions of institutionalization” 
(Oliver, 1991, p. 173). Furthermore, strategic choice theory has evolved from its original conception 
of decision-makers’ choice to extend to the environment within which the organization is operating, 
thus, viewing organizational structure and design as a factor of both characteristics of decision-
makers’ and environmental conditions. 
 
Institutional and strategic choice theories have primarily been applied in the context of 
organizational structures. We found one study that applied these theories together in the context of 
corporate governance (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). According to Judge and Zeithaml (1992), a 
board’s response to an environment depends on the institutional pressures an organization faces 
and the strategic judgment of top management. Strategic choice theory also offers a view of the 
consequences of board IT governance. This theory has been applied in the context of the 
performance outcomes associated with corporate governance (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992); however, 
our review of the literature did not find any studies that directly applied this theory to examine the 
performance outcomes of board IT governance. 
6. Theoretical Model and Propositions 
In the next few sections, this paper discusses the theoretical model and propositions, which Table 
2shows. The model proposes how the exercise of strategic choice and institutional forces impact the 
antecedents and consequences of board IT governance. 
 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical Model: Antecedents and Consequences of Board IT Governance 
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7. Antecedents to Board IT Governance 
7.1. Board Attributes and Board IT Governance 
As noted above, the model uses strategic choice theory to propose relationships between board 
attributes and board IT governance. Although prior research has not applied this theory to IT 
governance, strategic choice theory would suggest that board composition may influence the boards’ 
fulfillment of different roles. 
 
Board attributes refer to characteristics of the board: the proportion of insiders to outsiders, board 
size, and the IT competency of directors. We discuss each of these characteristics and the proposed 
relationship with board IT governance in turn. 
 
We refer to inside directors as those members of the board who are employed as part of the 
organization’s management team, their subordinates, relatives, or managers of the organization’s 
subsidiaries. Also, these directors could be members of the organization’s immediate past 
management team (Cochrane, Wood, & Jones, 1985). 
 
The proportion of inside directors appears to have been one of the most commonly studied variables 
in the corporate governance literature. There has been increasing pressure for boards to decrease 
their proportion of insiders based on the idea that the interests of insiders are aligned with those of 
management, while those of outsiders are aligned with stockholders. Thus, whereas insiders may be 
more likely to pursue strategies consistent with maximizing the size and diversity of the firm, outsiders 
may be more likely to pursue strategies consistent with maximizing the long-run profitability of the firm 
(Hill & Snell, 1988). Extensive prior research finds evidence consistent with this argument (see 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). However, many boards still have inside directors with, on average, 
inside directors making up 25 percent of board membership (University of Southern California Center 
for Effective Organizations and Heidrick & Struggles, 2007). In fact, there is some empirical and 
theoretical research supporting the desirability of inside directors on boards (e.g., Klein, 1998; Bhagat 
& Black, 2002; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Mace, 1986). 
 
These studies focus on the proportion of insiders as proxies for board processes, and the relationship 
between these proxies and some other measure, such as financial performance, instead of directly 
examining the relationship between proportion of insiders and governance involvement. We found 
three studies that explore the construct of board involvement directly in empirical studies and 
examine the relationship between proportion of insiders and governance. However, these studies 
yield mixed results. For example, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) and Baack (2000) find a negative 
relationship between insider representation and board involvement. Whereas Westphal (1999) find 
that insiders can increase board involvement by raising the frequency of advice and counsel 
interactions between CEOs and outside directors. 
 
It remains unclear what impact the proportion of insiders has on board involvement in governance. 
However, using strategic choice theory as the lens through which to study this relationship draws 
attention to the relevance of information for the exercise of strategic choice and points to the 
necessity of securing relevant information that is not ambiguous. We propose that insiders have 
relevant knowledge of IT and business activities that allow them to notify the board about 
organizational issues that necessitate board IT governance. Therefore, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 1: Insider representation is positively related to board IT governance. 
 
Board size is another of the most commonly studied variables in the corporate governance 
literature. While board size has been the subject of extensive research, we only found one study in 
the literature that directly studies the relationship between board size and board involvement in 
corporate governance. In that study, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) find a negative relationship 
between these variables. 
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Strategic choice theory focuses on management’s perceptions of environmental conditions and its 
ability to make decisions that cope with those conditions (Miles & Snow, 1978). Therefore, with 
respect to IT governance, strategic choice theory would suggest that the degree and type of board 
involvement will depend on the ability of the board to work together to effectively debate and discuss 
the organization’s IT. Therefore, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 2: Board size is negatively related to board IT governance. 
 
This research defines IT competency as the extent to which a board has IT expertise and uses IT 
governance mechanisms to govern IT. It is suggested that, while IT expertise and IT governance 
mechanisms are separate, both are required for IT competency. 
 
Expertise refers to “the characteristics, skills, and knowledge that distinguish experts from novices 
and less experienced people” (Ericsson, 2006). Previous studies of boards’ IT governance have 
suggested that boards may be falling short in their IT governance responsibilities because of an IT 
knowledge deficit (Bart & Turel, 2010; Huff et al., 2006). 
 
The second component of board IT competency is IT governance mechanisms. It is suggested that IT 
governance mechanisms increase the capacity of the board to acquire, interpret, and disseminate 
information, thus, increasing the ability of the board to govern IT. At the managerial level, it has been 
suggested that IT governance can be enacted using a variety of IT governance mechanisms – 
structures, processes, and relational mechanisms (e.g., De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2005, 2008a; 
Peterson, 2003; Weil & Ross, 2004). Table 2 outlines examples of IT governance mechanisms. 
 
Table 2. IT Governance Mechanisms1 
Structures  Roles and responsibilities, IT organization structure, CIO on Board, IT strategy committee, IT steering committee  
Processes  
Strategic Information Systems Planning, Balanced (IT) Scorecards, 
Information Economics, Service Level Agreements, COBIT and ITIL, IT 
alignment / governance maturity models 
Relational 
Mechanisms  
Active participation and collaboration between principle stakeholders, 
Partnership rewards and incentives, Business/IT co-location, Cross-functional 
business/IT training and rotation 
 
There have been a number of IT governance mechanisms recommended for the board, including: 
forming an IT Strategy Committee, engaging outside experts, reviewing and critiquing IT strategy 
projects and IT security practices, holding sessions with the CFO, and holding executive sessions 
with committee members (IT Governance Institute, 2003; Nolan & McFarlan, 2005). 
 
In this study, we examined how director IT competency, including IT expertise and IT governance 
mechanisms, influence IT governance. According to strategic choice theory, external constraints 
(environmental determinism) are insufficient for explaining decision-makers’ capacities for exercising 
choice, and one must also consider the characteristics of the decision-maker (action determinism), 
because predetermined mind-sets could limit the range of strategic choices recognized and 
considered by decision-makers (Whittington, 1988). In summary, board decisions are strategic in 
nature, and when faced with such decisions, decision-makers typically perceive only selected 
alternatives and adopt a simplified model of the situation that is largely shaped by their prior 
knowledge and experience (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). This research suggests that IT 
governance mechanisms increase information sources, thereby enabling directors to obtain more IT 
information both inside and outside of the organization, and thus, increase the board’s capacity to 
govern IT. Therefore, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 3: IT competency is positively related to board IT governance. 
                                                     
1 Adapted from Peterson (2003). 
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8. Organization Factors and Board IT Governance 
This research uses institutional theory to propose relationships between organizational factors and 
board IT governance (Figure 2). 
 
While we have not found any studies using institutional theory to examine IT governance at the board 
level, we did find two studies that use institutional theory to examine IT governance at the 
organizational level2
 
. These studies argue that removing the assumption of rationality (followed by 
much of the research) and using institutional theory as a new lens through which to view different IT 
governance modes has the potential to offer new insights into understanding the drivers of 
governance. Jacobson (2009) suggests that ”Examining institutional pressures and context can 
illuminate how IT governance is actually done. A much more dynamic picture is likely to emerge of IT 
governance in a context that both enables and constrains action”. Similarly, Boubaker and Nyrhinen 
(2008) propose that institutional pressures play a role in determining the IT governance mode. 
We propose that, in addition to rational pressures, institutional factors – referred to in this study as 
organizational factors – have an influence on board involvement in IT governance. Organizational 
factors refer to the size of the organization, the age of the organization, and the role of IT in the 
organization. We discuss each of these factors in turn. 
 
The relationship between organization size and board involvement does not appear to have been 
studied with respect to IT governance; however, it has been studied with respect to corporate 
governance (e.g., Baack, 2000; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). Judge and Zeithaml (1992) examine the 
relationship between the structural differentiation of organizations and board involvement in corporate 
governance. This is relevant because larger organization size has been suggested to be associated 
with increased structural differentiation (Blau, 1970). Judge and Zeithaml (1992) find that increased 
differentiation is negatively associated with board involvement. They use institutional theory to explain 
the relationship between differentiation and board involvement and suggest that “an organization’s 
level of diversification will be negatively associated with board involvement because isomorphic 
pressures should be more diffuse for diversified firms than for non-diversified ones” (Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992, p. 773). This research uses organization size as a proxy for level of differentiation, 
and, thus, views larger organizations as more differentiated. Therefore, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 4: Organization size is negatively related to board IT governance. 
 
It has been suggested that organizational processes reflect the practices at the time of founding 
because the organization adopts the predominant practices in that time. Furthermore, since 
organizational processes change slowly, many of the practices remain unchanged from the time of 
organization founding (Eisenhardt, 1988; Stinchcombe, 1965; Tolbert  &  Zucker, 1983). 
 
Stinchcombe (1965) first discusses this concept. He suggests that “the organizational inventions 
that can be made at a particular time in history depend on the social technology available at the 
time” (p. 153). He finds that organizations that were formed at one time typically have a different 
social structure from those formed at another time. More recent studies have also found a 
relationship between time of founding and organization structure (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1988; Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1983). According to this view, board activities, and thus, board IT governance, reflect a 
pattern of doing things that evolve over time and become legitimated within the board and the 
organization. Board activities are then resistant to change even in the face of major changes in the 
organization, such as the emergence of the strategic importance of IT. This research proposes that 
the institutional perspective holds and a board’s current practices reflect those at the time of 
founding. Therefore, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 5: Organization age is negatively related to board IT governance. 
 
The normative IT governance literature recommends a view of board involvement contingent on 
characteristics of the organization and its use of, and dependence on, IT (IT Governance Institute, 
                                                     
2 The authors would like to thank one of the reviewers for referring us to these two studies. 
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2003; Nolan & McFarlan, 2005). In a recent survey of directors, Bart and Turel (2010) find tentative 
support for the possibility of such a contingency-based view of IT governance based on the role of IT 
in the organization. Since institutional theory would suggest that industry norms influence 
organizational processes through isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and organizations with a 
high reliance on IT would likely be operating in an industry that also relies highly on IT, the industry 
norm would likely be higher board involvement in IT governance. Therefore, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 6: Overall role of IT in the organization is positively related to board IT 
governance. 
9. Consequences of Board IT Governance 
As Figure 2 shows, we use strategic choice theory to develop Proposition 7 regarding the relationship 
between board IT governance and the contribution of IT to firm performance. 
 
It has been argued that the management of IT, not just the quantitative investment in IT, can impact 
performance (Mata, Fuerst, & Barney, 1995; Byrd & Turner, 2001; Chatterjee, Richardson, & Zmud, 
2001). There is empirical evidence showing that the quality of the IT department can impact firm 
performance (Bharadwaj, 2000; Byrd & Turner, 2001; Santhanam & Hartono, 2003) and that CIO 
strategic decision-making authority influences the contribution of IT to firm performance (Preston, 
Chen, & Leidner, 2008). Based on this research and strategic choice theory, we theoretically derive 
the argument that the extent to which IT contributes to firm performance is a function of the level of 
the board’s involvement in IT governance. We did not find an empirical study directly examining the 
consequences of board IT governance during the literature review; however, evidence from a recent 
study on the relationship between proxies for board IT governance and firm performance suggests 
that a positive relationship exists (Boritz & Lim, 2007). In fact, there is empirical support for a positive 
relationship between board involvement in corporate governance and financial performance (Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992) and between proxies for board involvement in governance and firm performance 
(refer to Zahra and Pearce, 1989, for a review). 
 
According to strategic choice theory, organizational strategy and its processes affect firm 
performance (Miles & Snow, 1978). It has been argued that increased board involvement improves 
organizational strategy and its processes by “forcing managers to check their assumptions and do 
their homework before advancing strategic proposals”, and by “helping to challenge narrow thinking, 
escalating commitment, and weak analysis” (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992, p. 775). In fact, boards have 
the latitude to promote and provide oversight of strategic proposals, including IT proposals, that add 
value to the organization. Furthermore, there is some research indicating that when boards provide 
richer information, management is more likely to engage in behaviors that are consistent with 
stockholders interests (Richardson, 2000). Therefore, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 7: Board IT governance is positively related to the contribution of IT to firm 
performance. 
10. Methodology 
To test the model, we conducted interviews and a survey. Since the model comprises measured and 
latent variables, we first conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on the latent variables to 
analyze the sets of items that measure those constructs3
10.1 Data Collection 
. Next, we used ordinary least squares 
multiple regression to analyze the results. Each of these procedures is reported below. 
We first conducted 10 in-depth interviews with corporate directors to probe how they govern IT, what 
influences their involvement in IT governance, and what have been the performance consequences. 
The 10 directors interviewed were on a total of 47 boards, with each director on an average of five 
                                                     
3 EFA is useful for data reduction by condensing the information contained in a number of original variables into a smaller set of 
new, composite dimensions, with a minimum loss of information (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). EFA based on the 
Maximum Likelihood Extraction method, combined with varimax rotation was used for each of the latent variables. 
  
591 Journal of the Association for Information Systems  Vol. 13, Issue 7, pp. 581-617, July 2012 
 
Jewer & McKay / Board IT Governance 
 
boards. The boards were from a variety of industry sectors, with banks, savings, and other financial 
institutions representing the largest proportion of the sample. Additionally, the directors interviewed 
had an average of 13 years’ experience on boards, and most, seven out of the 10, identified 
themselves as having no prior experience working in an IT role or in the management of IT in an 
organization. Each interview took an average of 75 minutes to complete and consisted of an in-depth 
discussion of one IT governance decision and/or incident with which the director was involved while 
serving on a board, and a semi-structured questionnaire to discuss IT governance on all of the boards 
of which the director was a member. 
 
We used the results from the interviews, combined with findings in the literature, to create a survey 
to assess broad relationships between the antecedents and consequences of board IT governance. 
We paid specific attention to the interviews to develop measures for the constructs where 
measures have not been developed in past literature, namely board IT governance and IT 
competency. We used the transcribed interviews to augment the questions for the IT governance 
and IT competency constructs in the survey. The intention was to ensure that the components of 
board IT governance and IT competency provide an adequate coverage of the constructs. The 
interview phase provided some preliminary evidence to justify the next phase of research – 
investigating the propositions in a more quantitative fashion. 
 
We pre-tested the survey and redesigned it to address the comments of the pre-test participants4
 
. 
We then administered an electronic survey to the approximately 3,200 members of the Institute for 
Corporate Directors (ICD), and received 193 responses. It is difficult to determine the response rate 
because the survey was limited to respondents who were currently serving on a board of directors 
(self-identifying). The ICD’s Director of Communication indicated that 83 percent of the members 
classify themselves as a director; however this does not necessarily mean that a member is currently 
serving on a board. Therefore, a conservative estimate of the response rate would be 7 percent (193 
out of 2,656 members – 83 percent of 3,200 members). However, it is likely that the response rate is 
higher, as not all of the 2,656 members that classify themselves as directors were currently serving 
on a board. A survey of directors on IT governance in the professional literature reported a response 
rate of 0.046 percent (Deloitte Consulting LLP and Corporate Board Member Magazine, 2006). 
Appendix A provides an overview of the general characteristics of the 188 responses to our survey 
that were included in the final analysis5
 
. Due to lack of information on non-respondents, it was not 
possible to test if the responding group differed from the non-respondents. 
Since directors often serve on more than one board, they were asked to respond for the board of the 
largest organization they served. The responses were from many different industries, with no industry 
representing more than 11.2 percent of the sample. The largest percentages of respondents were 
from energy/utilities (11.2 percent), other service company (10.1 percent), other financial services 
companies (7.4 percent), insurance (6.9 percent), and advanced technology (6.4 percent). In addition, 
no one ownership type dominated the responses. Ownership of the organizations was almost evenly 
divided among non-profit (27.7 percent), privately (30.9 percent) and publicly (27.7 percent) held 
companies, with the rest of the responses from governmental organizations (13.3 percent). 
 
We also asked the respondents to identify some information about themselves. We first asked 
respondents to identify their current role(s) on the board. Please note that the total percent is greater 
than 100 because respondents were able to select multiple roles on the board. Notably, 46.3 percent 
of the respondents indicated that they were outside directors. This reflects guidelines in the literature 
that recommend that board composition consist of a large proportion of outside directors. In addition, 
                                                     
4 Pre-testing of the survey was conducted with two corporate directors, two leading researchers in IT governance, and an expert in 
survey design. During the pre-test, participants were asked to respond to the survey questions and give feedback on any of the 
items and any other issues they wished to share. The pre-test revealed comments on the survey layout, wording of the questions, 
and length of the survey. 
5 Of the 193 responses to the survey, four responses were omitted because they contained few or no answers to the survey 
questions. One additional response was deleted because multiple regression of board attributes and organization factors on 
board involvement in IT governance revealed that the response was an influential outlier. Multiple regression is highly sensitive to 
such responses, as they can overstate the coefficient of determination, give erroneous values for the slope and intercept, and 
lead to false conclusions about the model. 
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only 0.5 percent and 2.1  percent were CTOs and CIOs, respectively. This reflects the small 
proportion of CTOs and CIOs that sit on boards (e.g., Burson-Marsteller, 2005). 
 
It seems reasonable to assume that most of the respondents were familiar with their board’s 
approach to governance because 78.4 percent of the respondents had served for more than two 
years on the board for which they were answering the survey. Most of the respondents identified 
themselves as having little or no experience working directly in IT (less than two years) (66.8 
percent). This relatively low level of director experience in IT roles is indicative of what has been 
found in previous studies (e.g., Burson-Marsteller, 2005; Huff et al., 2006). Finally, the respondents 
were split between those who had no or less than two years experience in the general management 
of IT (48.4 percent) and those who had two or greater years of this type of experience (51.6 percent). 
10.2. Measures 
The measures were derived from a combination of prior work, the IT governance literature, this 
study’s theoretical model, and our interview findings. The definitions of the constructs and their 
corresponding references are in Table 3. Refer to Appendix B for the survey questions for the 
measured variables and for a list of the items for each construct resulting from EFA. 
 
Table 3. Constructs and Items in Theoretical Model 
 Construct Definition of Construct 
Translation of Construct 
to Items Theoretical References 
B
oa
rd
 IT
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
Board IT 
Governance  
The degree to 
which the board 
is involved in IT 
governance 
activities.  
EFA extracted one factor for 
board IT governance.  
Adapted from Nolan and McFarlan’s 
contingency model of board IT 
governance (2005), and guided by results 
of this study’s interviews with directors, 
and studies in the literature that directly 
measure the construct of board 
involvement in empirical studies (Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992; Johnson, Hoskisson, & 
Hitt 1993; Westphal, 1999; Baack, 2000).  
B
oa
rd
 A
ttr
ib
ut
es
 
Proportion of 
Insiders6
Number of inside 
directors divided 
by the total 
number of 
directors on the 
board.  
  
Common measure from the literature 
(see Johnson et al., 1993). 
Board size6 Total number of directors.  
Common measure from the literature 
(see Johnson et al., 1993). 
IT 
Competency  
Extent to which a 
board has IT 
expertise and 
uses IT 
governance 
mechanisms to 
govern IT.  
EFA extracted:  
(1) A three-factor model for 
IT expertise – internal 
knowledge, external 
information, and experience 
and training.  
(2) A two-factor model for IT 
governance mechanisms - 
internal activities, and 
external activities.  
(1) IT expertise scales adapted from 
Basellier, Benbasat, and Reich (2003)  
(2) IT governance mechanisms adapted 
from the literature (e.g., De Haes & Van 
Grembergen, 2005, 2008a, 2008b; IT 
Governance Institute, 2003; Nolan & 
McFarlan, 2005; Peterson, 2003; Weil & 
Ross, 2004)  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 The proportion of insider and board size variables were transformed by taking their natural log. This logarithmic transformation 
was performed to adjust for the nonlinearity between the dependent and independent variables and, thus, to ensure that the 
regression of assumption of linearity was not violated. 
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Table 3. Constructs and Items in Theoretical Model (cont.) 
 Construct Definition of Construct Translation of Construct to Items Theoretical References 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
ct
or
s 
Organization 
Size  
The number of 
employees in the 
organization.  
 
Common measure from 
the literature (see 
Judge & Zeithaml, 
1992).  
Organization 
Age  
Number of years since 
the organization was 
founded.  
 
Common measure from 
the literature (see 
Judge & Zeithaml, 
1992).  
Role of IT  
The degree to which the 
organization has 
strategic or operational 
reliance on IT.  
EFA extracted factors that are 
consistent with those proposed by 
Raghunathan et al. (1999). EFA 
extracted:  
(1) A three-factor model for strategic 
reliance on IT - managerial support, 
differentiation, and enhancement.  
(2) A one-factor model for operational 
reliance on IT.  
Raghunathan, 
Raghunathan, and Tu  
(1999)  
IT
 C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
to
 F
irm
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
IT Contribution 
to Firm 
Performance 7
Self-report of the degree 
to which IT contributes 
to: return on investment 
(ROI), sales revenue 
increase, market share 
increase, cost savings, 
operating efficiency, 
process improvement, 
and customer 
satisfaction. 
 
 
EFA extracted two-factors: (1) 
external performance metrics 
(consisting of sales revenue 
increase, market share increase, 
customer satisfaction, ROI), and (2) 
internal performance metrics 
(consisting of process improvement, 
operating efficiency, and cost 
savings)8
Preston et al. (2008) 
. 
 
The measured variables – proportion of insiders, board size, organization size, and organization age 
– are based on common measures in the literature (see Table 3) and require little comment; however, 
further discussion of the latent variables follows. EFA indicated that there was strong convergent and 
discriminatory validity in the data with the items included in each scale having moderate to very high 
factor loadings (all above 0.537). This indicated that the scales were measuring the intended 
concepts. In addition, reliability analysis (Cronbach’s alpha) tended to indicate excellent reliability 
(0.692 to 0.943), thus suggesting that the items in each scale reflected the same construct. 
10.3. Board IT Governance 
We reviewed the more general corporate governance literature to provide insight on how to measure 
board involvement in governance. Interestingly, prior research has seldom directly examined how 
                                                     
7 Examination of the survey data revealed that there was a large percentage of answers of “not applicable” for the operational 
performance variables for non-profit and government organizations. Therefore, these organizations were eliminated from this 
analysis and only privately held and publicly traded organizations were included (comprising 110 responses) in the analysis of the 
consequences of board IT governance. 
8 Since multiple regression requires one dependent variable, an overall operational performance measure was computed by 
summing the standardized scales of the external and internal performance dimensions. 
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boards conduct corporate governance. We found four studies that have explored the construct of 
board involvement in corporate governance directly in empirical studies (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; 
Johnson et al., 1993; Westphal, 1999; Baack, 2000). Building upon these studies and guided by the 
interviews we conducted, this research measures board IT governance using actual directors’ 
behaviors and actions in IT strategic decision making and oversight of IT. By using objective criteria 
for measuring board involvement, this model examines what is happening at the board level, rather 
than relying exclusively on proxy variables (e.g., board size or proportion of insiders) as indicators 
of what might or could be happening. As can be seen in Appendix B, the EFA extracted one factor 
for board IT governance. 
10.4. IT Competency 
Although we found no measures of IT competency in the context of board IT governance in the 
literature, there are several measures that provided a starting point. Basellier et al. (2003) developed 
IT expertise scales for business managers, and we used these IT expertise scales as a basis for the 
measure of IT expertise of directors in this research. IT governance research has also pointed to the 
presence of IT governance mechanisms such as structures, processes, and relational mechanisms 
as imperative to the proper governance of IT. Most of this research has focused at the managerial 
level; however, several studies have also been conducted at the board level (e.g., Boritz & Lim, 2007; 
De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2005). We added to and modified the IT expertise and IT governance 
mechanisms measures in the literature to ensure that all measures were appropriate for the board of 
directors in the context of providing IT governance. 
 
Using EFA, we made iterative modifications to the items to measure IT expertise. Any items that did 
not have strong convergent and discriminate validity were deleted from the EFA until satisfactory 
levels were reached. The final three-factor model – internal knowledge, external information, and 
experience and training – is presented in Appendix B9
 
. 
Using EFA, we also made iterative modifications to the items to measure the level of IT governance 
mechanisms present on the board. As with the IT expertise construct, we deleted from the EFA any 
items that did not have strong convergent and discriminate validity for the IT governance mechanisms 
construct until satisfactory levels were reached. The final two-factor model – internal activities and 
external activities – is presented in Appendix B10
10.5. Role of IT 
. 
EFA of the role of IT revealed factors that are consistent with those proposed by Raghunathan et al. 
(1999) (Appendix B). Just as in Raghunathan et al. (1999), we found that the items comprising the 
operational reliance on IT capture the importance of the organization’s current systems to the 
achievement of its current operations. Additionally, the three factors – managerial support, 
differentiation, and enhancement – comprising the strategic reliance on IT represent three ways that 
new IT can have a future role in an organization. 
10.6. IT Contribution to Firm Performance 
Since many of the respondents are from non-public organizations, this research uses primary 
(subjective) sources of operational performance data. The operational performance measure used in 
this research is a self-report of the degree to which IT contributes to seven operational performance 
measures that Preston et al. (2008) derived in previous research. The two-factor measure represents 
two dimensions of IT contribution to firm performance. The first factor captures the external 
performance metrics, and the second factor captures the internal performance metrics (Appendix B). 
 
                                                     
9 The first factor, internal knowledge, captures the extent to which board members are knowledgeable about IT policies, 
performance, budget, or other information within the organization. The second factor, external information, focuses on the extent 
to which board members are knowledgeable about information outside of the organization or technology, in general. The third 
factor, experience and training, consists of the extent of experience and training of directors on the board. 
10 The first factor, internal activities, captures the structures, processes, and relational mechanisms that involve activities that include 
the consideration of IT inside the boardroom. The second factor, external activities, refers to the processes that occur outside of 
the boardroom. 
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11. Data Analysis 
Table 4 shows that five of the propositions were supported, one proposition was not supported, and 
one proposition had a contradictory finding11
 
. 
Table 4. Summary of Survey Findings 
 Proposition Findings and Direction Conclusion 
Antecedents to IT 
Governance 
 
1 Proportion of Insiders → Board IT Governance  ** (negative) contradictory 
2 Board Size → Board IT Governance  * (negative) supported 
3 IT Competency → Board IT Governance  ** to *** (positive) supported 
4 Organization Size → Board IT Governance  not significant not supported 
5 Organization Age → Board IT Governance  ** (negative) supported 
6 Overall Role of IT → Board IT Governance  * to *** (positive) supported 
Consequences of 
IT Governance 7 
Board IT Governance → Contribution of IT to 
Firm performance  *** (positive) supported 
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
Table 5 provides the Pearson bivariate correlations for the antecedents and consequences of IT 
governance. Board IT governance demonstrated bivariate correlation with all of the independent 
variables except for proportion of insiders and number of directors, indicating that these constructs 
appear to be important in understanding board involvement in IT governance. 
 
Table 5. Correlation Matrix 
 Insid  NoDir  ExpF1  ExpF2  ExpF3  MecF1  MecF2  OrelF1  SrelF1  SrelF2  SrelF3  Perf  
NoDir  -.435**            
ExpF1  .021 -.068           
ExpF2  -.011 .011 .014          
ExpF3  -.105 .256** -.004 .044         
MecF1  -.223* .132 .611** .127 .270**        
MecF2  .104 .032 .325** .210* .103 -.008       
OrelF  -.120 .084 .260** -.137 -.071 .202* .073      
SrelF1  .026 .031 .220** .006 -.157 .151 .267** .284**     
SrelF2  -.117 .059 .354** .160 .244** .359** .150 .348** -.004    
SrelF3  -.081 .060 .229** .016 -.061 .293** -.067 .409** .001 -.002   
Perf         .410** .210* .485** .086  
ITG  -.163 .009 .641** .293** .239** .577** .422** .190* .307** .326** .182* .447** 
Legend: Insid = Proportion of Inside Directors, NoDir = Number of Directors, ExpF1 = IT Expertise Factor 1, ExpF2 = IT 
Expertise Factor 2, ExpF3 = IT Expertise Factor 3, MecF1 = IT Mechanisms Factor 1, MecF2 = IT Mechanisms Factor 2, OrelF 
= Operational Reliance on IT Factor, SrelF1 = Strategic Reliance on IT Factor 1, SrelF2 = Strategic Reliance on IT Factor 2, 
SrelF3 = Strategic Reliance on IT Factor 3, Perf = Contribution of IT to Performance, ITG = IT Governance.  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
We used ordinary least squares hierarchical multiple regression to analyze the antecedents and 
consequences of board IT governance. We performed regression diagnostics to assess the model’s 
adherence to the regression assumptions and to identify any data problems. The analysis showed 
                                                     
11 Regression diagnostics were performed to assess the model’s adherence to the regression assumptions and to identify any data 
problems. The analysis showed that the model supported the assumptions that underlie multiple regression such as linearity, 
independence of errors, homoscedasticity, and normality of residuals. Furthermore, the analysis of the data problems focusing on 
the distance, leverage, and influence indicated that there were no problems present. 
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that the model supported the assumptions that underlie multiple regression such as linearity, 
independence of errors, homoscedasticity, and normality of residuals. Furthermore, the analysis of 
the data problems focusing on the distance, leverage, and influence indicated that there were no 
problems present. Table 6 shows the model summary at each step in the hierarchical regression of 
board involvement in IT governance on organization factors and board attributes. 
 
Table 6. Regression – Antecedents to Board IT Governance 
 Variables Propositions 4, 5 and 6 
Propositions 1, 2 
and 3 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
Fa
ct
or
s 
Intercept  .109 (.245) .498 (.412) 
Organization Size - Smalla -.268 (.315) -.286 (.223) 
Organization Size – Mediuma -.467 (.291) -.408+ (.205) 
Organization Size -Largea -.152 (.293) -.091 (.208) 
Organization Age – 20 years or lessb .307+ (.181) .167 (.137) 
Operational Reliance on IT  -.119 (.109) -.002 (.079) 
Strategic Reliance on IT – Factor 1 – Managerial Support  .335*** (.093) .170* (.070) 
Strategic Reliance on IT – Factor 2 - Differentiation  .380*** (.093) -.003 (.076) 
Strategic Reliance on IT – Factor 3 - Enhancement  .221* (.096) .042 (.072) 
B
oa
rd
 A
ttr
ib
ut
es
 
Proportion of Insiders   -.573** (.194) 
Board Size   -.785* (.369) 
IT Expertise Factor 1 – Internal Knowledge   .435*** (.095) 
IT Expertise Factor 2 – External Knowledge   .210** (.065) 
IT Expertise Factor 3 – Experience and Training   .218** (.072) 
IT Governance Mechanisms Factor 1 – Internal Activities   .146 (.098) 
IT Governance Mechanisms Factor 2 – External Activities   .185** (.074) 
Step 1   
 F Value  4.962***  
 Model R-Square  .284***  
 Adjusted R-Square  .227***  
Step 2   
 F Value   13.049*** 
 Model R-Square   .678*** 
 Adjusted R-Square   .626*** 
 Change in R-Square   .394*** 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
a Dummy variable for organization size with “small” composed of those organizations with less than or equal to 100 employees, 
“medium” composed of those with 101-500 employees, “large” composed of those with 501-5000 employees, and the 
contrast group is those with 5001 or greater employees.  
b Dummy variable for organization age with 0 = formed more than 20 years ago, 1 = formed 20 years ago or less.  
 
The first set of variables entered in the hierarchical regression, the organization factors, resulted in a 
statistically significant, explanation of variance ( = 0.284, p < 0.001). The second set of variables 
entered into the regression equation, board factors, explained a statistically significant increase in the 
board involvement in IT governance ( = 0.394, p < 0.001), for a total explained variance of = 0.678, p 
< 0.001. This indicates that organization factors are insufficient in explaining board involvement in IT 
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governance – explaining only 28.4 percent of the variance in board IT governance involvement – and 
that by also including board attributes, approximately 68 percent of the variance is explained. 
 
As proposed, we found a significant negative relationship at the .05 level between board size and 
board IT governance (Proposition 2), and a significant positive relationship at the .01 to the .001 
levels between IT competency and board IT governance (Proposition 3) 12
 
. However, a higher 
proportion of insiders on the board did not result in a significant positive effect on board IT 
governance (Proposition 1). Instead the opposite effect was found – the lower the proportion of 
insiders on the board, the more likely the board would be involved in IT governance, which 
contradicts Proposition 1. 
With respect to the organization factors, organization size was not a significant predictor of board IT 
governance (Proposition 4). However, the rest of the propositions with respect to the relationship 
between organization factors and IT governance were supported. We found age to be significantly and 
negatively related to board IT governance at the .01 level (Proposition 5), and we found a significant 
positive relationship at the .05 to .001 levels between overall role of IT in the organization and overall IT 
governance involvement (Proposition 8)13
 
. Table 7 shows the model summary at each step in the 
hierarchical regression of IT contribution to firm performance on board involvement in IT governance. 
Table 7. Regression – Consequences of Board IT Governance 
Variables Proposition 7 – Model 1 Proposition 7 – Model 2 
Intercept  .197 (0.424) -.075 (.385) 
Ownership a .567+ (0.325) .423 (.294) 
Organization Size - Smallb -.687 (0.626) -.192 (.573) 
Organization Size – Mediumb -.490 (0.569) .035 (.524) 
Organization Size - Largeb -.948 (0.547) -.587 (.497) 
Organization Age – 20 years or lessc .294 (0.366) .155 (.330) 
IT Governance   .337*** (.073) 
F Value  1.104 21.004*** 
Model R-Square  .062 .251*** 
Adjusted R-Square  .006 .197*** 
Change in R-Square   .190*** 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
a Dummy variable for ownership with 0 = publicly traded, 1 = privately held.  
b Dummy variable for organization size with “small” composed of those organizations with less than or equal to 100 employees, 
“medium” composed of those with 101-500 employees, “large” composed of those with 501-5000 employees, and the contrast 
group is those with 5001 or greater employees.  
c Dummy variable for organization age with 0 = formed more than 20 years ago, 1 = formed 20 years ago or less.  
 
Model 1 presents the control variables for the regression, and Model 2 adds the independent 
variable, IT governance, representing the full model. The control variables entered in the first step 
of the hierarchical regression (Model 1) did not result in statistically significant explanation of 
variance. However, the board IT governance variable entered in the second step of the regression 
                                                     
12 The coefficients of the IT competency constructs show that all but one of the coefficients is significantly and positively related to 
board IT governance (Table 6). The internal knowledge, external knowledge, experience and training, and external activities 
factors are significant at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.01, and 0.01 levels, respectively. The IT governance mechanisms internal activities 
factor is not significant; however, removing this factor from the regression reduces the overall R2; therefore, this variable is kept in 
the model. 
13 The operational reliance on IT factor is not statistically significant; however, the managerial support, differentiation, and 
enhancement factors for the strategic reliance on IT are significant at the 0.001, 0.001, and 0.05 levels, respectively (Table 6). 
Removing the operational reliance on IT factor from the regression reduces the overall R2; therefore, this factor is kept in the 
model, and Proposition 8 is accepted. 
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equation (Model 2) explained a statistically significant increase in IT contribution to firm 
performance (= 0.190, p < 0.001). Therefore, board IT governance explains 19 percent more 
variance of IT contribution to firm performance. The regression coefficient of board IT governance 
shows that it is significant and positively related to contribution of IT to firm performance at the 
0.001 level. Therefore, Proposition 7 is accepted. 
12. Discussion 
Both the exercise of strategic choice and institutional forces appear to impact the antecedents and 
consequences of board IT governance. 
 
In the first premise of our theoretical model, we used strategic choice theory to propose relationships 
between board attributes and board IT governance. Although prior research has not applied this 
theory to board involvement in IT governance, it appears that it may be an appropriate theoretical 
lens through which to examine the impact of board attributes on IT governance since the data 
analysis suggests that a board’s composition may influence its involvement in IT governance. 
However, not all propositions were supported. 
 
Contrary to Proposition 1, a negative relationship was found between the proportion of insiders and 
board IT governance. As we previously discussed, the relationship between insiders and board 
involvement in corporate governance has also yielded mixed results in previous studies. To 
examine the relationship between the proportion of insiders and board IT governance further, we 
investigated two alternate arguments. 
 
First, it has been argued that boards rely on outside directors to reduce agency costs associated with 
monitoring managerial decision making and performance, whereas inside directors are relied on as 
the main source of advice on strategic issues (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). To investigate whether this 
argument holds and whether it might help explain the negative relationship found between proportion 
of insiders and overall board IT governance, we analyzed the relationship between insiders and two 
types of board IT governance activities that were introduced by Nolan and McFarlan (2005) – (1) 
defensive activities involving the monitoring of management and (2) offensive activities involving the 
provision of advice. According to Baysinger and Butler’s argument (1985), there should be a negative 
relationship between inside directors and defensive IT governance (monitoring managerial decision 
making) and a positive relationship between inside directors and offensive IT governance (providing 
advice to management). However, we found that insiders were significantly and negatively related to 
both defensive (= 0.025, p < 0.1, the regression coefficient for proportion of insiders was significant 
and negatively related at the 0.1 level) and offensive IT governance (= 0.029, p < 0.05, the regression 
coefficient for proportion of insiders was significant and negatively related at the 0.05 level) (refer to 
Appendix C – Analysis 1). Therefore, Baysinger and Butler’s argument (1985) does not appear to 
help explain the contradictory finding of Proposition 1. 
 
Second, we proposed an alternate argument that boards with a larger proportion of insiders may have 
more knowledge of IT management and have more comfort in IT management and, thus, do not feel 
as much of a need to be involved in IT governance as would boards with a smaller proportion of 
insiders. To examine this argument, we regressed board IT governance on proportion of insiders and 
various measures of level of comfort the board has in IT management. We added a cross-product 
term (Proportion of Insiders X Level of Comfort Measure) to the model to test the possible interaction 
between proportion of insiders and level of comfort (low and high levels for four types of comfort – 
competency, integrity, transparency, and reliability) and their effects on board IT governance. The 
regressions resulted in statistically significant explanations of variance; however, the interaction terms 
were not statistically significant (refer to Appendix C – Analysis 2). This suggests that the proportion 
of insiders has the same effect on board IT governance for both low and high levels of comfort in IT 
management. Thus, the reasons for the negative relationship between proportion of insiders and 
board IT governance are not clear, and future work is needed in this area. It may be that, as is 
suggested in much empirical and theoretical research (see Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003), a higher 
proportion of insiders may diminish the effectiveness of governance. 
 
Our analysis of the survey data confirmed the proposed negative relationship between board size and 
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board IT governance (Proposition 2). As proposed using strategic choice theory, it may be that the 
level of board involvement increases as the size of the board decreases because the smaller board 
size enhances the ability of the board to work together and contribute to deliberations. Given that this 
is the only study examining this relationship, the survey results are compelling evidence for the 
negative effect of board size on IT governance; however, further research is needed. 
 
The strong support for the positive relationship between IT competency (IT expertise and IT 
governance mechanisms) and board IT governance is important because it offers the first empirical 
support for this relationship. This finding confirms the conceptual IT governance literature on the 
importance of directors’ IT competency for board IT governance (e.g., Burson-Marsteller, 2005; Huff 
et al., 2006; Jordan & Musson, 2004; IT Governance Institute, 2003; Nolan & McFarlan, 2005). The 
strong statistical significance of this relationship in the survey data suggests the importance of 
directors’ IT competency in contributing to their involvement in IT governance. These findings support 
Proposition 3, which, based on strategic choice theory, proposed that competence may push back 
limits on the exercise of choice by decision-makers and, thus, encourage board IT governance. 
Therefore, the argument that structures, processes, and relational mechanisms enable decision-
makers to access relevant information in a timely fashion, and that expertise enables decision-makers 
to deal with the information when making strategic choices is supported. 
 
In the second premise of our theoretical model, we used institutional theory to propose relationships 
between organization factors and board IT governance. The proposed negative relationship between 
organization size and board IT governance was not supported in the survey data; however the 
interview data seemed to suggest that the negative relationship does exist (Proposition 4). Mixed 
results have also been reported in the literature. The relationship between organization size and 
corporate governance was examined by Baack (2000) in a study in which she found a positive 
relationship existed. However, the level of differentiation in an organization (we used organization 
size as a proxy for level of differentiation) was found to be negatively related to corporate governance 
(Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). The mixed findings of the interviews and survey in this research and the 
conflicting findings from the literature with respect to board involvement in corporate governance 
indicate that future research is needed to investigate this relationship further. 
 
The analysis of the relationship between organization age and board IT governance yielded 
interesting insights. As proposed, the survey data revealed that boards of younger organizations 
(20 years or younger) were more likely be involved in IT governance than boards of older 
organizations (Proposition 5). This is in line with prior literature that has used institutional theory to 
suggest that organizational processes reflect the practices at the time of founding because the 
organization adopts the predominant practices in that time and because organizational processes 
are resistant to change (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1988; Stinchcombe, 1965; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). This 
research offers early, if not the first, evidence that, as suggested in the normative literature, the 
greater an organization’s reliance on IT, the greater a board’s IT governance (IT Governance 
Institute, 2003; Nolan & McFarlan, 2005) (Proposition 6). 
 
Finally, for our third premise, we proposed that the extent to which IT contributes to firm performance 
is a function of the level of board involvement in IT governance. We found a significant and positive 
relationship between board IT governance and the contribution of IT to organizational performance 
(Proposition 7). In fact, board IT governance explained 19 percent of the variance in the contribution 
of IT to organizational performance. To our knowledge this is the first research that directly examined 
the performance consequences of board IT governance. 
 
In addition to examination of the premises of our theoretical model, the responses to survey questions 
revealed another interesting result. Much of the IT governance research has recommended the use of 
board-level IT Strategy Committees to aid decision making (e.g., IT Governance Institute, 2003; 
Nolan & McFarlan, 2005; Peterson, 2003); however, as other studies have found (e.g., De Haes & 
Van Grembergen, 2005; Ernst & Young, 2006; Huff et al., 2006), we also found that most boards do 
not have such committees – 91 percent of the respondents to our survey indicated that his/her board 
did not have such a committee.  
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In fact, during our interviews, some of the directors were strongly opposed to an IT strategy 
committee, and they commented: 
 
Do you have a marketing committee of the board, do you have a commercial banking 
committee, no – you’d have 100 committees. 
 
No. Boards avoid more committees… [there] used to be lots of committees, most of us 
are spending our time shrinking such committees, as opposed to creating another 
category. 
 
We do strategy sessions at the board level and the CTO is part of those strategy 
sessions, but no specific committee. And it wasn’t really a consideration. Who has time? 
It’s a huge problem. 
 
Future research could investigate the role of such committees, as there is limited understanding of 
how or when IT Strategy Committees are effectively incorporated in board decision-making. For 
example, a field study of a Belgian financial group found that even though the company had an IT 
Strategy Committee it “did not enable a more thorough and ongoing involvement of boards in IT 
governance” (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2005, p. 5). 
12.1. Contributions 
This research has several contributions to theory and to boards’ practice of IT governance. The 
theoretical model is characterized as more exploratory than confirmatory and can be viewed as an 
early step toward understanding antecedents and consequences of IT governance. This somewhat 
limits the explanatory ability, thus, while not offering a prescriptive solution for all boards, this 
research will help identify key antecedents and consequences that may be applicable in selected 
settings. We discuss the implications for research and practice in turn. 
12.2. Implications for Research 
First, this research contributes to theory by responding to the recognized need for more research on 
board IT governance. 
 
Second, this research contributes by developing and testing a multi-theoretic model of the 
antecedents and consequences of IT governance. From a theoretical perspective, the extant 
literature does not adequately describe and explain why some boards are involved in IT governance 
or whether firms with board IT governance have superior firm performance. Using strategic choice 
theory and institutional theory to study antecedents to actual board governance of IT and its 
consequences, this research was able to investigate these questions. Strategic choice and 
institutional theories appear to offer complementary views of why boards decide to become involved 
in the governance of IT. Board and organizational antecedents as strategic adaptations or institutional 
responses to IT governance needs are explored. Use of the two theories allowed the inclusion of 
antecedents to board IT governance, which have not been investigated in prior research and, 
therefore, offer a richer view of such governance. The survey’s results showed that organizational 
factors explain 28.4 percent of the variance in board IT governance, and that board attributes explain 
39.4 percent more of the variance, for a total explained variance in board IT governance of 
approximately 68 percent. Therefore, as proposed, each theory gives only a limited explanation of the 
whole phenomenon regarding the antecedents to board IT governance. Taken together, 
organizational factors and board attributes provide a richer, more complex view of the antecedents to 
IT governance. This may encourage researchers of board IT governance to explore the impact of 
organizational factors in addition to role of IT on board IT governance, and to continue to explore the 
impact of board attributes on board IT governance. In addition, the results of the survey suggest a 
relationship contrary to the one proposed for proportion of insiders and board IT governance. The 
negative relationship found suggests that a theory other than strategic choice may be applicable. 
Examination of the consequences of board IT governance using strategic choice theory through the 
survey confirmed the positive impact of board IT governance on the contribution of IT to 
organizational performance, explaining 19 percent of the variance. 
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The third theoretical contribution is the empirical assessment of the antecedents and consequences 
of board IT governance. As discussed, the survey results offer support for many of the antecedents 
and consequences of board IT governance proposed in prior literature and in the theoretical model of 
this research. Additionally, this research makes a contribution by being possibly the first to empirically 
examine the application in practice of Nolan and McFarlan’s (2005) IT strategic impact grid. 
 
Finally, we feel that our examination of board IT governance and board-level IT competency has 
responded, in part, to the call for board researchers to “go beyond structuralism and to examine 
board processes, board behavior, and directors’ cognition….in order to improve our understanding of 
the board of directors’ contribution to strategy” (Pugliese et al., 2009, p. 301). In a review of research 
on the relationship between boards of directors and strategy from 1972 to 2007, Pugliese et al. (2009) 
find that board research is evolving from normative and structural approaches to behavioral and 
cognitive approaches. For example, Useem and Zelleke (2006) and Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) 
conducted interviews with directors to study board processes. 
 
Similarly, in our study, building upon prior research and guided by the interviews we conducted, we 
measured board IT governance using actual directors’ behaviors and actions in IT strategic 
decision making and oversight of IT, we also measured IT competency of directors using the survey 
respondents’ assessment of the IT expertise of the directors on the board and their use of IT 
governance mechanisms. By using objective criteria for measuring board involvement, we examine 
what is happening at the board level and the IT competency of directors, rather than relying 
exclusively on proxy variables (e.g., board size or proportion of insiders) as indicators of what might 
or could be happening. This is a first step toward opening the black box of board-level IT 
governance research. With our measure of board IT governance, we have enriched the 
understanding of how boards govern IT by identifying distinct dimensions of board involvement in 
IT governance. Similarly, with our measure of IT competency, we identified types of IT expertise 
and specific IT governance mechanisms through which IT governance can be enacted at the board 
level. IT governance mechanisms include structure, processes, and relational mechanisms such 
as: Including IT as an item on the agenda of the board; interaction of the board with senior IT 
management, and communication between board members and IT management (including CIO) 
between scheduled meetings. With a better understanding of board-level IT governance and IT 
competency and the development of measures for these constructs, further investigation of these 
measures and their impacts is now possible. We would like to further develop a behavioral and 
cognitive approach to study the contribution of boards to IT governance through a longitudinal 
study to explore the board processes and through collecting primary data using interviews, surveys, 
and direct observation techniques. 
12.3. Implications for Practice 
Directors should be reminded that, as with corporate governance, boards have a fiduciary duty and a 
duty of care in IT governance, they are responsible for acting honestly and in good faith and for 
spending time to make informed business judgments. Directors need to stop ignoring IT and start 
paying more attention to developing leadership and organizational structures and processes that 
ensure that the organization’s IT sustains and extends the organization’s strategies and objectives. 
 
Perhaps the greatest motivation for board involvement in IT governance is the significant positive 
relationship that board IT governance was found to have with the contribution of IT to 
organizational performance for the survey respondents. This is especially noteworthy given that 
there appears to be much room for improvement in board IT governance, with, on average, the 
survey respondents rating their boards’ overall IT governance effectiveness at 53 percent (an 
average of 2.6 on a 5-point scale). Therefore, directors should mindfully examine their board’s IT 
governance to assess if their level of involvement is appropriate and if it enables a greater 
contribution of IT to their organization’s performance. 
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Directors may find it useful to ask themselves the degree to which14
 
: 
• IT is an item on the agenda of the board 
• The board encourages the inclusion of IT on the meeting agenda 
• The board works well with senior IT management 
• Some board members and IT management (including CIO) communicate between scheduled 
meetings 
• The recruitment of board members includes consideration of IT expertise 
• The board gets independent assurance on the containment of IT risks 
• The board gets independent assurance on the achievement of IT objectives 
• There are regular sessions for outside directors to discuss IT. 
 
Our survey results suggest that the level of IT governance practiced by a board is a factor of both board 
characteristics (and a function of rational choice) and organizational characteristics (and a function of 
institutional pressures). Thus, board IT governance is not only a function of rational choice by directors, 
but it is also influenced by institutional pressures. Directors, thus, need to be more sensitive to the 
characteristics of their board and of their organization because these characteristics may be influencing 
the mode of their board’s IT governance. For example, the significant relationship between board 
characteristics (i.e., board size and IT competency) and IT governance may encourage boards to 
manipulate factors that are under their control in an attempt to increase their involvement in IT 
governance, while being cognizant of the organizational characteristics (i.e., organization age and role 
of IT) that may be influencing the board’s governance of IT. Directors could reevaluate the size of their 
board to assses whether it is impeding debate and discussion. Furthermore, the identification of director 
IT competencies as antecedents of board IT governance may encourage boards to recruit directors with 
formal IT training (42 percent of the survey respondents had no directors with formal IT training) or to 
enlist their board in IT governance training programs (86 percent of the survey respondents identified 
their board as not having received IT governance training). 
12.4. Limitations 
There are some limitations in this exploratory research that should be mentioned. First, the relatively 
small sample and the inclusion of only members of the ICD in the sample limit the capacity to 
generalize the research findings. However, demographics of the respondents suggested that 
organizations from a variety of industries and ownership types were represented, and that the 
directors held a variety of positions on their boards. In addition, one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) tests indicate that no statistically significant differences in the level of board IT 
governance exist in the responses of board members representing different ownership types of 
organizations. In other words, level of board IT governance practiced by a board does not differ by 
ownership type of organization15
 
. 
The second limitation is the possible response bias due to the fact that the survey relies on a single 
respondent. To assess validity and reliability, it would have been preferable to obtain multiple 
respondents per board. However, given the difficulty of obtaining responses to surveys in field 
research, and particularly with respect to board members, this was accepted as a limitation. 
 
The third limitation is the potential for bias in the data due to self-reporting. It would have been helpful 
to have correlated the self-report, especially the self-report of the contribution of IT to organizational 
performance, with objective performance measures gathered from an independent source. However, 
it was not possible to use performance measures from secondary sources in this research because a 
large portion of the responding organizations were not publicly traded and, therefore, financial 
information was not publicly available. Subjective measures of performance have been used in 
previous research, and results similar to objective measures have been found. 
 
                                                     
14 Items for the IT governance construct developed for this survey using EFA and shown in Appendix B. 
15 There was no statistically significant difference between boards of organizations of different ownership types as determined by 
one-way ANOVA (F(3,159) = 1.798, p = .150). A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that there were no statistically significant 
differences in terms of board IT governance between the different ownership types of organizations. 
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The final limitation in this research is its cross-sectional versus longitudinal nature. In particular, a 
longitudinal study of the effects of board IT governance on firm performance would have provided more 
information and may have enabled a more accurate portrayal of the performance consequences. 
13. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a theoretical model based on strategic choice and institutional theories to 
understand the antecedents and consequences of board IT governance. Based on the theoretical 
model, we conducted interviews and a survey of corporate directors. The results indicate that some 
board attributes and organizational factors influence board involvement in IT governance, and that a 
contribution of IT to organizational performance appears to be positively influenced by increased 
involvement of boards in IT governance. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. 
Table A-1. Industry Composition of Survey Respondents 
Industry Number Percent Industry Number Percent 
Advanced technology  12 6.4 Healthcare provider / Managed care 10 5.3 
Agriculture  2 1.1 Industrial / Agricultural equipment  3 1.6 
Bank and Savings institutions  10 5.3 Insurance  13 6.9 
Chemicals  3 1.6 Metals and Metal products  8 4.3 
Construction services and 
building materials  3 1.6 Non-profit  5 2.7 
Consumer products  2 1.1 Other  8 4.3 
Crown Corporation  4 2.1 Other financial institutions  14 7.4 
E-commerce  4 2.1 Other healthcare  4 2.1 
Education  2 1.1 Other manufacturing  4 2.1 
Electronics/Electrical 
equipment  2 1.1 Other service company  19 10.1 
Energy/Utilities  21 11.2 Professional services  10 5.3 
Entertainment/Hospitality  5 2.7 Publishing  1 .5 
Forest and Paper products  1 .5 Retail  3 1.6 
Healthcare 
product/Pharmaceuticals  7 3.7 Transportation/Distribution  8 4.3 
Total: 188  
 
Table A-2. Ownership of the Organizations 
 Number Percent 
Ownership 
Government  25 13.3 
Non-profit  52 27.7 
Privately held  58 30.9 
Publicly traded  52 27.7 
Total  188 100 
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Table A-3. Respondents’ Board and IT Experience 
 Number Percent 
Number of Years on the Board 
Less than 2 years 40 21.6 
More than 2 years 145 78.4 
Total 185 100 
Number of Years in an IT Role 
None 113 60.4 
Less than 2 years 12 6.4 
2 - 10 years 19 10.2 
More than 10 years 43 23 
Total   
Number of Years of General Management of IT Experience 
None 84 44.7 
Less than 2 years 7 3.7 
2 - 10 years 37 19.7 
More than 10 years 60 31.9 
Total 188 100 
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Appendix B. 
Table B-1. Survey Questions for Measured Variables 
Variable Survey Question 
Proportion of Insiders - the 
number of insiders divided 
by the total number of 
directors on the board.  
(i) How many directors are on the board?  
(ii) How many outside directors are on the board? (Outside directors 
are those members on the board who are not employed as part of the 
organization’s management team, their subordinates, relatives, or 
managers of the organization’s subsidiaries. Also these directors are 
not members of the organization’s immediate past management team.)  
Board size - the total number 
of directors.  How many directors are on the board?  
Organization size - the 
number of employees in the 
organization.  
Approximately how many employees does the organization have? 
Less than 50, 51 – 100, 101 – 500, 501 – 1000, 1001 – 5000, 5000 – 
10000, More than 10000  
 
List of items for each construct resulting from exploratory factor analysis (EFA): 
 
1. Board IT Governance 
2. IT Expertise 
3. IT Governance Mechanisms 
4. Role of IT 
5. Contribution of IT to Organizational Performance. 
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1. Board IT Governance 
Table B-2.  EFA of Board IT Governance 
Analysis 1: Level of Overall Involvement in IT Governance 
Maximum Likelihood Solution (One Factor Extracted) 
 Overall IT Governance 
Eigenvalue:  8.058 
Variance Explained:  57.554% 
Cronbach’s Alpha:  0.943 
IT project governance/management methodologiesa 0.827 
Training and development to ensure the needs are fully identified and 
addressed for all staffa 
0.806 
Compliance with the agreed organizational risk profile of ITa  0.804 
Workforce planning and investment to ensure recruitment and retention 
of skilled IT staffa  
0.796 
Monitors that IT delivers against the strategy through clear 
expectations and measurementb  
0.787 
Performs IT governance assurance and self-assessmentb  0.779 
Organization’s progress or performance toward better IT governancea  0.772 
Compliance with IT to laws, regulations, industry standards and 
contractual commitmentsa  
0.764 
Identifies possible IT threats and opportunities critical to the future of 
the organizationb  
0.756 
Shapes the business/IT strategic alignmentb  0.740 
Stakeholders' satisfaction with IT (e.g. measured through a survey 
and/or number of complaints)a  
0.706 
Contribution from IT to a competitive advantagea  0.703 
Advises during major IT decisionsb  0.702 
IT risks to which the organization is exposeda  0.656 
a Indicates the extent to which the board monitors the following issues or activities. (Scale 1: Not at all - 4: To a large extent, 
N/A)  
b Indicates the extent to which the board is involved in the following activities. (Scale 1: Not at all - 4: To a large extent, N/A)  
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2. IT Expertise 
Table B-3.  EFA of Level of IT Expertise 
Analysis 1: Level of IT Expertise on the Board 
Maximum Likelihood Solution / Varimax Rotation 
 
Factor 1 
Internal 
Knowledge 
Factor 2 
External 
Information 
Factor 3 
Experience 
and Training 
Eigenvalue:  8.417 1.957 1.374 
Variance Explained:  46.760 10.872 7.632 
Cronbach’s Alpha:  0.914 0.885 0.840 
IT policies in the organizationa .801 .270 .081 
Performance of ITa .791 .358 .092 
IT risks to which the organization is exposeda .789 .251 .092 
Overall IT budget of the organizationa .788 .056 .049 
Overall IT strategy/vision of the organizationa .782 .281 .195 
IT resources (people, systems, financials) in the organizationa .775 .285 .190 
Existing IT used in the organizationa .637 .366 .151 
IT or business people to contact within the organization as 
sources of information about ITa .551 .344 .190 
Indicate the degree to which information from management 
about the organization's IT operations and management 
practices is sufficientb 
.537 .107 .200 
Secondary sources of knowledge as source of information about 
ITb .277 .810 .210 
Applications in general (i.e., internet, electronic data interchange, 
e-commerce, Groupware)a .244 .797 .130 
IT or business people to contact outside of the organization as 
sources of information about ITa .213 .789 .181 
Technology in general (i.e., personal computer, client-server, 
LAN, imagery technology, multimedia technology) a .282 .721 .038 
Systems development in general (i.e., traditional systems 
development life cycle, end-use computing, prototyping, 
outsourcing, project management practices) a 
.224 .640 .333 
Other directors to contact as sources of information about ITa .309 .567 .333 
How many directors have worked directly in an IT role within an 
organization or as a consultant or academic (e.g. in areas such 
as IT development, IT implementation, participation or leadership 
in new IT projects, management of IT projects)?c  
.142 .173 .885 
How many directors have received formal training in IT (i.e. 
certificates, diplomas, undergraduate or graduate degrees)?c .111 .188 .837 
How many directors have experience in the general 
management of IT within an organization or as a consultant or 
academic (e.g. in areas such as participation in the creation of 
an IT vision statement, IT strategy, IT policies, or IT budgets)?c 
.237 .244 .743 
a The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about…(Scale 1: Not knowledgeable – 5: Very knowledgeable)  
b Scale 1: Not knowledgeable - 5: Very knowledgeable  
c Scale None, 1 director, 2-5 directors, more than 5 directors, don’t know  
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3. IT Governance Mechanisms 
Table B-4. EFA of Governance Mechanisms 
Analysis 1: Level of IT Governance Mechanisms Presence on the Board 
Maximum Likelihood Solution / Varimax Rotation 
 Factor 1 Internal Activities 
Factor 2 
External Activities 
Eigenvalue:  4.283 1.176 
Variance Explained:  53.536 14.694 
Cronbach’s Alpha:  0.846 0.828 
IT is an item on the agenda of the boarda  0.870 0.134 
The board encourages the inclusion of IT on the meeting 
agendaa  
0.855 0.239 
The board works well with senior IT managementb  0.753 0.213 
Some board members and IT management (including CIO) 
communicate between scheduled meetingsb  
0.672 0.216 
The recruitment of board members includes consideration 
of IT expertisec  
0.582 0.374 
The board gets independent assurance on the containment 
of IT risksa  
0.144 0.910 
The board gets independent assurance on the achievement 
of IT objectivesa  
0.254 0.899 
There are regular sessions for outside directors to discuss 
ITa  
0.486 0.591 
a Indicates the degree to which the following items describe the board's processes. Where 1 is "Not at all", 2 is "Not really", 3 is 
"To some extent", and 4 is "To a large extent".  
b Indicates the degree to which the following items describe the board's relationship and communication with management. 
Where 1 is "Not at all", 2 is "Not really", 3 is "To some extent", and 4 is "To a large extent".  
c Indicates the degree to which the following items describe the board/management structure. Where 1 is "Not at all", 2 is "Not 
really", 3 is "To some extent", and 4 is "To a large extent".  
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4. Role of IT 
Table B-5. EFA of Role of IT 
Analysis 1: Operational Reliance on IT in the Organization 
Maximum Likelihood Solution (One Factor Extracted) 
 Factor 1  
Eigenvalue:  4.258 
Variance Explained:  70.973% 
Cronbach’s Alpha:  0.917 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements as they relate to the 
existing IT in the organization, where 1 is “disagree strongly” and 5 is “agree strongly”. 
IT breakdown will critically affect one or more of our functional departments  0.890 
Organization relies heavily on IT for efficient operation  0.875 
IT is vital to our organization  0.864 
IT breakdown for extended periods will affect organizational activities severely  0.863 
IT breakdown will affect our database access  0.796 
IT breakdown will affect overall coordination within our organization  0.758 
 
Table B-6. EFA of Role of IT 
Analysis 2: Strategic Reliance on IT in the Organization 
Maximum Likelihood Solution / Varimax Rotation 
 
Factor 1 
Managerial 
Support 
Factor 2 
Differentiation 
Factor 3 
Enhancement 
Eigenvalue:  4.227 1.24 1.033 
Variance Explained:  46.965% 13.782% 11.482% 
Cronbach’s Alpha:  0.841 0.785 0.692 
Please indicate the significance of the following items as components of your portfolio of planned IT projects, 
where 1 is “very unimportant” and 5 is “very important”:  
Projects whose primary benefit is providing new decision 
support information to top management  0.850 0.175 0.165 
Projects whose primary benefit is providing new decision 
support information to middle and lower levels of 
management  
0.837 0.149 0.055 
Projects which enable development of new administrative 
control and planning processes  0.728 0.221 0.248 
Projects which offer significant tangible benefits through 
improved operational efficiencies  0.601 0.328 0.450 
Projects which will allow the organization to develop and offer 
new products or services for sale  0.113 0.915 0.058 
Projects which appear to offer new ways for the organization 
to compete  0.235 0.861 0.112 
Projects involving application of new technologies  0.312 0.576 0.291 
Projects focusing on routine maintenance to meet evolving 
business needs, new regulatory or legal requirements  0.069 0.154 0.861 
Projects focusing on existing systems enhancements  0.307 0.083 0.798 
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5. Contribution of IT to Organizational Performance 
Table B-7. EFA of Contribution of IT to Organizational Performance 
Analysis 1: Operational performance 
Maximum Likelihood Solution / Varimax Rotation 
 Factor 1 - External Performance 
Factor 2 - 
Internal Performance 
Eigenvalue:  4.389 1.101 
Variance Explained:  62.705% 15.735% 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.882 0.880 
Please assess the extent to which IT has contributed to the following seven areas of organizational 
performance. Where 1 is "Contribution is minimal" and 5 is "IT has contributed to a very great extent". 
Sales Revenue Increase  .943 .172 
Market Share Increase  .917 .244 
Customer Satisfaction  .676 .488 
Return on Investment (ROI)  .655 .355 
Process Improvement  .225 .892 
Operating Efficiency  .244 .883 
Cost Savings  .353 .783 
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Appendix C. 
Table C-1. Supplemental Analysis 1 – Effects of Proportion of Insiders on Type of IT 
Governance 
Variables  Defensive IT Governance Offensive IT Governance 
Proportion of Insiders  -.442+ (.252) -.475* (.238) 
F Value  3.088+ 4.001* 
Model R-Square  .025+ .029* 
Adjusted R-Square  .017+ .021* 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
Table C-2. Supplemental Analysis 2 – Effects of Proportion of Insiders and Level of Comfort 
in IT Management on Board IT Governance 
Variables Level of Comfort – Transparency 
Level of Comfort – 
Competency 
Level of Comfort – 
Integrity 
Level of Comfort 
– Reliability 
Intercept  -.469 (.318) -.666 (.426) -.744+ (.397) -.531 (.350) 
High Level of 
Transparency .396 (.402)    
High Level of 
Competency   .624 (.516)   
High Level of Integrity    .737 (.473)  
High Level of Reliability     .508 (.431) 
Proportion of Insiders  -.155 (.407) -.422 (.584) -.472 (.575) -.177 (.480) 
Proportion of Insiders 
and High Level of 
Transparency 
Interaction  
-.362 (.555)    
Proportion of Insiders 
and High Level of 
Competency Interaction  
 -.001 (.742)   
Proportion of Insiders 
and High Level of 
Integrity Interaction  
  .220 (.692)  
Proportion of Insiders 
and High Level of 
Reliability Interaction  
   -.243 (.609) 
F Value  5.754*** 5.458** 4.440** 6.041*** 
Model R-Square  .127*** .121** .101** .132*** 
Adjusted R-Square  .105*** .099** .078** .110*** 
Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
a Dummy variable for level of transparency of IT management, composed of those responses with transparency rated 4 or 5 on 
a five point scale.  
b Dummy variable for level of competency of IT management, composed of those responses with competency rated 4 or 5 on a 
five point scale.  
c Dummy variable for level of integrity of IT management, composed of those responses with integrity rated 4 or 5 on a five 
point scale.  
d Dummy variable for level of reliability of IT management, composed of those responses with reliability rated 4 or 5 on a five 
point scale.  
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